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This contribution aims at identifying a correlation between 
the European Union (EU) international trade policy - limited in 
this contribution to mixed agreements between the EU and third 
countries - and the dual-use export controls outreach programme 
implemented by the EU, called P2P (Partner to Partner) export control 
programme for dual-use goods (P2P).1 
In a first place, preliminary definitions will be set out to clarify 
what it is meant by mixed agreements and to identify the geo-
graphical scope of both variables: EU mixed agreements signed/
being negotiated worldwide and third countries part of the EU 
P2P programme. 
It will follow and an analytical comparison which, by over-
lapping the geographical scope of the two variables, will look for 
countries part of the P2P which have also signed a trade agreement 
(TA) with the EU. At this stage of the analysis, the inclusion of a 
1 P2P is the EU Outreach Export Control programme, started in 2004 and renamed 
P2P only in February 2016. The programme is divided into three pillars: Dual-Use 
Export Controls programme; Council Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports 
Outreach Programme; and the Arms Trade Treaty Outreach Project. Fore more infor-
mation, please see the EU P2P Export Control Programme o!cial website, available 
on: https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu.
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WMD non-proliferation clause in these agreements will be inquired 
as proof of coherency between EU international trade policy and 
export controls priorities. The inclusion or non-inclusion of the 
WMD non-proliferation clause, as well as the date of the agree-
ments will be considered as tools seeking to identify the underlying 
logic driving the (co)relation between EU international trade and 
its dual-use export controls programme. 
The last part of the paper will seek to test the correlation in 
practice, by comparing the outcomes of the P2P in two different 
countries, Kazakhstan and Jordan. 
The final aim of the analysis is the identification of the inde-
pendent variable, which means to answer the question: is EU inter-
national trade policy serving dual-use export controls’ objectives 
or is it the opposite? 
Finally, some concluding remarks will make some considera-
tions on the nature of the relation between trade and export controls 
and will advance some advises for ways forward. 
1. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 
The conclusion of trade agreements with third countries is one 
of the main and most important parts of the EU external trade policy. 
According to the content of the agreement and, by conse-
quence, the procedure for negotiation and approval, it is possible 




While Union-only agreements cover matters following under 
EU exclusive competences (e.g. competition policy, trade dispute 
settlement mechanisms, technical barriers to trade, etc.), mixed 
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agreements include also elements which are not of EU exclusive 
competence, notably political issues falling within Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). 
As for procedural rules, while Union-only agreements are 
adopted by the Council usually by qualified majority vote, mixed 
agreements, as established in Article 218 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, require the consensus in the 
Council, the approval by the European Parliament and the ratifica-
tion by all Member States, following their constitutional procedures.
Every EU agreement including conditionality clauses, such as 
the human rights clause or the WMD non-proliferation clause is a 
mixed agreement. Given the necessity to inquire on the inclusion/
exclusion of the WMD non-proliferation clause in agreements 
signed with countries part of the P2P programme, this paper will 
deal only with mixed agreements. It is not the objective of this con-
tribution to make a complete overview on the number and nature of 
all the international agreements signed by the EU, being the focus 
of this brief analysis limited to agreements signed with countries 
part of the P2P programme. However, it could be useful to have a 
visual idea of EU trade agreements reach, which is worldwide, as 
shown in the map below.2
2 Source: European Commission, DG Trade. Available on http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149622.pdf.
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As for the geographical scope of P2P export control programme 
for dual-use goods, it involves 32 countries, divided into six main 
regions: 
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2. ANALYTICAL COMPARISON 
Considering the 32 countries part of the P2P, the analysis aims 
at identifying how many of these countries signed a trade (mixed) 
agreement with the EU and among the considered agreements, 
how many contain the WMD non-proliferation clause. 
It comes out that 18 out of 32 P2P countries signed a trade 
agreement with the EU: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, 
Lebanon, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Serbia, 
Tunisia and Ukraine.
As for the remaining 14 countries, 8 out of 14 are in negotiation 
phase (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines 
and Thailand) and for the 6 remaining countries, discussions have 
not started yet, at least officially (Belarus, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Pakistan and United Arab Emirates). 
The situation of the 32 P2P countries a regard to the signing of 
trade agreements (TA) with the EU is summed up the graph below.
32 P2P Countries
 18 signed TA
 8 in negotiation
 6 nothing (yet)
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Within the 18 trade agreements signed, only 7 contain a WMD 
non-proliferation clause: Albania (May 2006), Montenegro (April 
2010), Bosnia Herzegovina (June 2015), Ukraine (January 2016), 
Kazakhstan (April 2016), Georgia (July 2016) and Moldova (July 
2016). 
18 P2P Countries signed TA
 7 WMD clause
 11 No WMD clause
      
Despite the fact that 11 agreements do not contain any WMD 
non-proliferation clause, it is worth to consider these agreements 
by paying attention to the date of their entry into force: Algeria 
(Euro-Med A. 2005), Armenia (Sept. 1999), Azerbaijan (September 
1999), Egypt (June 2004), Jordan (May 2002), Kosovo (April 2016), 
Lebanon (March 2003), Macedonia (April 2004), Morocco (March 
2000), Serbia (September 2013) and Tunisia (March 1998). 
It is quite interesting to remark that 8 out of 11 agreements, 
which do not contain any WMD non-proliferation clause, entered 
into force before the entry into force of the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 (UNSCR 1540).3
Indeed, Resolution 1540 acted as a watershed in the recent 
history of international relations, especially for dual-use items export 
3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 
2004. Available on: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/
RES/1540%20(2004).
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controls. It can be argued that the implementation of export controls 
for security reasons became an issue after the entry into force of 
the resolution. Furthermore, given the legal force of the resolution, 
adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a sort 
of international duty/right to establish trade controls was born. 
UNSCR 1540, in fact, imposes binding obligations on all States to 
Under this perspective, the non-inclusion of a WMD non-pro-
liferation clause in trade agreements preceding the entry into force 
of Resolution 1540 is understandable. Following this logic, only 3 
out of the 11 agreements represent an exception: Algeria (September 
2005), Serbia (September 2013) and Kosovo (April 2016).
11 TA without WMD
 3 TA post 1540
 8 TA pre 1540 to update
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This WMD non-proliferation clause logic could be confirmed 
by the fact that the 8 trade agreements signed before the entry into 
force of Resolution 1540 are all in negotiation phase to be updated. 
WMD clause in 18 signed TA
 7 signed TA with WMD 
(Post 1540)
 8 TA to update (pre 1540)
 3 TA no WMD (Post 1540)
It is worth to notice that the wording, as well as the position of 
the WMD non-proliferation clause in the trade agreement is more 
or less the same, at least for the agreements analysed in this paper. 
As for its position in trade agreements, the clause is always 
included under the political dialogue section, under a provision 
which varies from article 8 to article 11 (see below).
An example on the wording of the WMD non-proliferation 
clause is provided below. (From the Association Agreement between 
the EU and Georgia, entered into force on July 2016)4 
4 ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the 
other part, O!cial Journal of the European Union, OJ L 261/4 of 30/08/2014. 
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ARTICLE 10
Weapons of mass destruction
1. The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, both 
to State and non-State actors, represents one of the most 
serious threats to international peace and stability. The Parties 
therefore agree to cooperate and to contribute to counter-
ing the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery 
through full compliance with, and national implementation 
of, their existing obligations under international disarmament 
and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, and other 
relevant international obligations. The Parties agree that this 
provision constitutes an essential element of this Agreement. 
2. The Parties furthermore agree to cooperate and to contribute 
to countering the proliferation of WMD and their means of 
delivery by: 
 —  (a)  taking steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropri-
ate, and fully implement, all other relevant international 
instruments; and 
 —  (b)  establishing an effective system of national export 
controls, controlling the export as well as transit of 
WMD-related goods, including a WMD end-use con-
trol on dual-use technologies, and containing effective 
sanctions for breaches of export controls. 
 —  The Parties agree to address these issues in their political 
dialogue.
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Trade agreements pre-UNSCR 1540 without WMD non-prolif-
eration clause:
1. Armenia, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 
9 September 1999 (Negotiations started in 2015 to enhance 
the agreement) 
2. Azerbaijan, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 
17 September 1999 (Negotiations foreseen to enhance the 
current agreement, but not scheduled yet)
3. Jordan, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 1 May 2002 
(Negotiations started in 2012 for a DCFTA5)
4. Egypt, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 1 June 2004 (in 2013 
dialogues stared to enhance the agreement into a DCFTA) 
5. Lebanon, Interim Agreement, 1 March 2003
6. Morocco, Association Agreement, 1 March 2000 (in 2013 
launch of negotiations for a DCFTA) 
7. Tunisia, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 1 March 1998 
(negotiations started in 2015 to launch a DCFTA)
8. Macedonia, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 1 April 
2004
5 DCFTA: Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.
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Trade agreements post-UNSCR 1540 (with WMD non-prolifer-
ation clause + 3 exceptions): 
1. Ukraine, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, 1 
January 2016 and - Association agreement - 29 May 2014: Art. 
11.2(b) WMD non-proliferation clause and export controls
2. Moldova, Association agreement, 1 July 2016: Art. 9.2(b) 
WMD non-proliferation clause and export controls
3. Georgia, Association agreement, 1 July 2016: Art. 10.2(b) 
WMD non-proliferation clause and export controls
4. Albania, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 27 May 
2006: Art. 8.3 WMD non-proliferation clause and export 
controls
5. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement, 1 June 2015: Art. 10.3(b) WMD non-prolifera-
tion clause and export controls
6. Kosovo, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 1 April 
2016: No reference to WMD non-proliferation clause nor 
export controls 
7. Montenegro, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 29 
April 2010: Art. 10.3(b) WMD non-proliferation clause and 
export controls
8. Serbia, Stabilisation and Association Agreement, 1 September 
2013. No reference to WMD non-proliferation clause nor 
export controls 
9. Algeria, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 1 September 2005: 
No reference to WMD non-proliferation clause nor export 
controls 
10. Kazakhstan, Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, 30 April 2016: Art. 11(a) WMD non-prolifera-
tion clause and export controls
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3. CORRELATION IN PRACTICE: 
KAZAKHSTAN VERSUS JORDAN 
Before entering in the core of the case-studies analysis, it is 
worth to keep in mind the selection criteria, applied by the EU, to 
propose countries to be part of the P2P programme. 
The first criterion is the relevance of the “targeted” country 
for the EU security and foreign policy. On this basis, considering 
EU security and foreign policy priorities is possible to identify a 
list of potential candidate countries. As example, in the EU Global 
Strategy6, some strategic regions are identified as partners to further 
develop human rights-compliant anti-terrorism cooperation (North Africa, 
the Middle East, the Western Balkans and Turkey).7 
The second criterion is the importance of the country as EU 
trading partner. The more there are trade exchanges between coun-
tries, the more these will be willing to cooperate on other policies. 
Dealing with a very specific sector of trade that is dual-use 
goods export controls, the industrial structure of the country, with 
capacity in trade in dual-use items (as exporter, importer, trade 
facilitator, trading hub) is very relevant as well. 
The above listed criteria are crosschecked with the comple-
mentarity to other EU funded projects. In other words, the EU is 
more willing to cooperate with countries which are already part-
ners/beneficiaries of other EU instruments, such as Instrument 
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance or other foreign policy instruments.
Last but certainly not least, while looking for partner countries, 
the EU has to consider the third country’s willingness to cooperate 
in the area of dual-use export controls. 
6 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, available on: https://europa.
eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union.
7 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy, June 2016, p. 21. 
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In order to test the correlation, on the basis of concrete results 
achieved during the implementation of dual-use outreach activ-
ities, two countries part of the P2P programme are considered: 
Kazakhstan and Jordan.
The choice of these two countries as case-studies for this paper 
is explained by their different status as regard the inclusion of the 
WMD non-proliferation clause in trade agreements with the EU. 
The trade agreement between the EU and Jordan was signed before 
the entry into force of Resolution 1540 and it does not include any 
provision on the WMD non-proliferation clause, while the agree-
ment with Kazakhstan, being signed after the entry into force of 
the Resolution, does. The first objective of the correlation test is 
to inquire if the inclusion/exclusion of the clause in trade agree-
ments makes any difference in terms of results achieved. The second 
objective of the test is to make an evaluation on the impact of EU’s 
outreach activities in the area of dual-use trade controls. 
Kazakhstan and Jordan have both a strategic relevance to the 
EU, although for different reasons. The cooperation between the 
EU and Kazakhstan started in 19991 and was recently renewed, 
in April 2016 with the signing of an Enhanced Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (EPCA). Kazakhstan is a EU’s key energy 
supplier and world’s leading uranium producer, two elements fill-
ing up the first selection criteria above-mentioned. It is also a key 
trading partner for China, Russia and Ukraine, all countries having 
a strategic importance for the EU for both economic and politi-
cal reasons. Furthermore, Kazakhstan is member of the Russian-
Kazakh-Bielorussian customs union, a fact which per se might appear 
as negligible, but indeed opens up the possibility to think about a 
dual-use trade control system between countries not part of an 
integration process (such as the EU). Finally, Kazakhstan is part of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and of the Zangger Committee. 
On the other side, Jordan signed a Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement in May 2002, although the preparatory process for 
launching negotiations of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
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Area (DCFTA) has already started. Jordan has a strategic geo-po-
litical location for the Middle-East Region and its main trading 
partner is Saudi Arabia. Contrary to Kazakhstan it is not member 
of any international export control regime. 
In terms of outcomes, EU outreach activities went a little bit 
further in Kazakhstan with the establishment of an identification 
centre (IC) but, for the rest, results achieved in both countries are 
very similar. In both countries, the main achievement has been the 
translation of EU dual-use Regulation and control list into Arabic 
in Jordan and into Russian in Kazakhstan. Despite the fact that it 
might appear as a minor achievement, the translation of EU dual-use 
Regulation and control list allowed not only for a knowledge of EU 
legislation in these countries but, more important, for the update of 
their national control lists introducing, indirectly through the EU, 
main updates introduced at the international level by export control 
regimes. Kazakhstan is also amending its export control regulation 
to harmonise it with international norms and practices, especially 
EU’s and US’ ones. Main amendments will concern: the enhance-
ment of existing definitions, the inclusion of new definitions such 
as “intangible technology transfer” and “brokering activities”, the 
establishment of identification centres, modifications in the control 
list and provisions aiming on the criminalisation of brokering. 
Jordan, on its side, is proceeding with the elaboration of a 
correlation list. Finally, both countries are in process of introducing 
additional provisions on brokering activities for Kazakhstan and 
transit and transhipment for Jordan (which is also receiving legal 
support, by the EU and the US, in the drafting process). 
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4. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
WAYS FORWARD
The analytical comparison of trade agreements signed between 
the EU and P2P countries showed that, before the entry into force 
of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, EU trade 
agreements did not include any WMD non-proliferation clause 
and preceded dual-use export control outreach programmes. In 
this sense, trade agreements were concluded with third countries 
regardless their strategic trade control system. 
On the contrary, since the entry into force of Resolution 1540, 
EU trade agreements not only include (with few exceptions) a WMD 
non-proliferation clause but also do follow export controls outreach 
programmes. As proof of this modus operandi, all countries part of 
the P2P coming from the Asia and South-East Asia Regions did 
not sign any trade agreement with the EU, but negotiations have 
started in almost all countries (see infra). 
In other words, it seems that the EU, before starting negotia-
tions for trade agreements with a given country, will seek to include 
this “targeted” country in its trade controls outreach programme. In 
this sense,, trade controls outreach activities seem to serve more as a 
tool to prepare the playfield before the game than a final aim per se. 
As for the inclusion of the WMD non-proliferation clause in 
trade agreements, this does not seem to make any difference in term 
of concrete outcomes, as shown by the case-studies on Kazakhstan 
and Jordan. Still, the inclusion of the clause in these agreements 
seems to be now the rule, considering the fact that all trade agree-
ments not containing such a clause were signed before Resolution 
1540 and are now in the review process to be enhanced/updated 
(see infra). Given the lack of concrete impact of the clause in term 
of outcomes, one might wonder why the EU “insists” on this clause. 
It could be argued that the clause would represent a sort of legal 
incentive authorising States to implement WMD non-proliferation 
policy and to cooperate in this field. 
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Finally, as regard to the impact of EU dual-use outreach activ-
ities, it seems that the spill over effect is the best result, at least for 
the two considered countries. In this context, by spill over effect is 
meant the introduction into third countries’ trade control systems of 
international standards and “soft” legal and political harmonisation 
with EU export control system and legislation and, indirectly, with 
more general international standards (e.g. international export 
control regimes). 
Considering the findings of the analysis presented in this 
paper, it seems that the independent pattern can be identified in 
the EU international trade rather than in its dual-use trade control 
outreach activities. It means that although it is true that dual-use 
trade control outreach activities shape international trade and con-
tribute to create/spread international standards, they finally serve 
EU international trade priorities. This specific correlation between 
EU international trade and EU export controls policy in outreach 
activities is quite realistic and “expected”, but it could undermine 
EU’s credibility vis-à-vis its engagement to WMD non-proliferation 
policy. It remains to be seen next developments concerning trade 
agreements with P2P countries, currently in negotiation phase. 
The inclusion of the WMD non-proliferation clause in all 
trade agreements, whatever the partner country, together with its 
effective implementation could demonstrate, at least from a formal 
perspective, EU’s engagement to export controls outreach activities 
for WMD non-proliferation purposes instead that for “setting the 
table before negotiations”. 
The implementation/strengthening of trade controls through 
outreach activities as incentive, for both parts, to go ahead with 
trade agreements should never counteract the ultimate goal of dual-
use trade controls, that is the prevention of WMD proliferation 
and other related security threats. Once the incentive becomes 
the ultimate goal for both parts and the ultimate goal is spotted 
with inconsistencies, dual-use trade controls, whatever outreach 
or inreach, are likely to become a dysfunctional superstructure, 
